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I. INTRODUCTION

In InternationalBancorp, the Fourth Circuit introduced a new interpretation
of the Lanham Act's "use in commerce" clause,' which turned existing rules
governing the protection of foreign trademarks upside down. Granting Lanham
Act protection to a mark attached to services rendered exclusively in Monaco,'
the court presented a novel understanding of "use" of a mark "in commerce,"
which could eventually extend the protection of U.S. trademark law to marks
used solely outside the United States. In all events, International Bancorp
denotes a major shift away from earlier decisions,3 which had put stronger
emphasis on the principle of territoriality of trademark protection.4
The background of the decision is relatively simple. Boiled down to its
essentials, the defendant, a Monaco company, operates a casino under the mark
"CASINO DE MONTE CARLO."5 The defendant advertises the mark in the
United States, renders its casino services solely in Monaco, and holds no
registration for his mark in the United States. 6 The plaintiffs, who operate a
number of websites incorporating the name "Casino de Monte Carlo," brought an
action seeking declaratory judgment as to whether they were entitled to such use
of the name.7 On appeal from the District Court, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit ruled in favor of the defendant, holding the "use in commerce"
requirement was satisfied because American consumers traveled to and gambled
at defendant's facilities in Monaco.'
This outcome gives the law governing the protection of foreign trademarks a
new turn and is likely to have far reaching consequences for trademark lawyers
and their clients in the United States as well as abroad. Courts have addressed the
issue of protection of foreign-used trademarks in the United States in prior
decisions, but those were mainly cases of exclusive foreign use. In these cases, no
goods or services were sold to U.S. citizens and no display or advertisement of

1. 15U.S.C.§ 1127 (2003).
2. SBM H, 329 F.3d at 361.
3. See generally Buti v. Impressa Perosa, S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 1998); Person's Co. v.
Christman, 900 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Imperial Tobacco, Ltd. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 899 F.2d 1575; (Fed.
Cir. 1990); Rivard v. Linville, 133 F.3d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Shinohara Shoji
Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1985); La Societe Anonyme des Parfums le Galion v. Jean Patou,
Inc., 495 F.2d 1265 (2d Cir. 1974); CBS, Inc. v. Logical Games, 719 F.2d 1237 (4th Cir. 1983); The
Momingside Group Limited v. Morningside Capital Group, L.L.C., 182 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 1999).
4. The territoriality-doctrine essentially stipulates that a trademark is recognized as having a separate
existance in each sovereign territory in which it is legally recognized as a mark. Thomas McCarthy,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 29:1, 4th ed. 1996 [herinafter MCCARTHY].
Therefore, trademark use in foreign countries generally does not create protectible trademark rights in the
United States. See also CBS, 719 F.2d at 1239; La Societe Anonyme des Parfums le Galion, 495 F.2d at 1271.
5. SBM II, 329 F.3d at 361.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 365-66.
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the mark occurred in the United States or was directed at American consumers.
In these prior cases, courts generally stressed the principle of territoriality of
trademark law and were unwilling to grant Lanham Act protection on the basis of
activities abroad.' ° International Bancorp is the first case where a court had to
decide whether Lanham Act protection can be granted to a mark which is
advertised in the United States, but is attached to services rendered and
purchased by Americans exclusively in another country.
The Fourth Circuit's decision is not completely without merit. A more
generous interpretation of the "use in commerce" requirement meets the demands
of global trade and trademark use where territorial boundaries have become less
important. Yet the court leaves some important questions unanswered and
introduces a seemingly boundless understanding of "use" of a mark "in
commerce," which would eventually allow foreign trademarks to be protected
under U.S. law, even if they are not used within the geographic borders of the
United States. The court should have outlined the scope of its novel interpretation
of the "use in commerce" clause more precisely and provided more viable criteria
to narrow it down to a reasonable scale.
Part II of this note gives an overview of the history and operations of the
parties and sets out the factual and procedural background of this litigation. Part
III examines the court's reasoning, including its analysis of related case
authority. It then turns to a critique of the court's interpretation of the "use in
commerce" clause and investigates its possible consequences.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. History and Operationsof SBM
Appellee-Defendant and counterclaim plaintiff Societe des Bains de mer et
du Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco ("SBM") was established in the Principality
of Monaco in 1863." Its majority shareholder is the government of Monaco.'2
SBM owns and operates a variety of resort hotels and gambling facilities in
Monte Carlo, a quartier'3 of Monaco.' 4 One of SBM's properties has operated

9. See generally Person's Co., Ltd. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Imperial Tobacco,
Ltd. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 899 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki
Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1985); La Societe Anonyme des Parfums le Galion v. Jean Patou, Inc., 495 F.2d
1265 (2d Cir. 1974); CBS, Inc. v. Logical Games, 719 F.2d 1237 (4th Cir. 1983).
10. See generally Buti v. Impressa Perosa, S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 1998); Rivard v. Linville, 133
F.3d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Person's Co., 900 F.2d 1565; Imperial Tobacco, Ltd, 899 F.2d 1575; Fuji Photo
Film Co., 754 F.2d 591; La Societe Anonyme des Parfums le Galion, 495 F.2d 1265; CBS, Inc., 719 F.2d 1237.
11. International Bancorp v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco, 192 F.
Supp. 2d 467, 470-71 (E.D.Va.2002) [hereinafter SBM I].
12. Id. at 471.
13. SBM 11,
329 F.3d at 361 (stating that the Principality of Monaco is comprised of four "quartiers").
14. Id.; see also SBM 1, 192F. Supp. 2dat471.
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under the name "Casino de Monte Carlo" since the company's formation in
1863. " The name "Casino de Monte Carlo" is registered as a trademark for SBM
under the laws of Monaco.' 6 However, SBM had not obtained a registration of the
mark in the United States. Although SBM filed for a registration with the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office on November 7, 2001, the registration was still
pending when the case was litigated. 7 Besides using the "CASINO DE MONTE
CARLO" trademark, SBM had registered and used various domain names, some
of which incorporated the words "casino" and "monte-carlo" in different
variations. At the time the complaint was filed, SBM provided no online
gambling services. However, it was undisputed that SBM had such services
under development.20
SBM promotes the Casino de Monte Carlo and its other resort and gambling
facilities on a worldwide scale, to many countries including the United States.2
Since 1984, SBM operates an office in New York to promote North American
tourism to Monaco22 and to its own properties in particular. 3 The office, which
operates with four employees, 24 is one of SBM's international sales offices from
which American customers can book reservations for SBM's facilities" in
Monaco.26 SBM's promotional efforts conducted from the New York office
consist of participation in trade shows, advertising campaigns, charity
partnerships, direct mail solicitation, internet web sites, telephone marketing and
solicitation of media coverage throughout the United States.2 7 These activities
include the advertising of SBM's "Casino de Monte Carlo" and the display of the
"CASINO DE MONTE CARLO" trademark." SBM has received significant
media coverage in newspapers and lifestyle magazines in the United States
regarding its resorts and casinos, especially the Casino de Monte Carlo.2 9 SBM's
promotions in the United States are funded with approximately one million
dollars annually,30 a sum that constitutes roughly twenty-five percent of the

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
"facilities"
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

SBM 1I, 329 F.3d at 361.
Id.
SBMl, 192 F. Supp. 2dat471.
Id.
Id.
Id.
SBMI, 329F.3dat361;SBMI,192F. Supp. 2dat471.
SBMI, 192 F. Supp. 2dat471.
SBMII, 329F.3dat361;SBMI192F.Supp. 2dat471.
SBM 11, 329 F.3d at 361.
SBM 1, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 471. When reviewing the record, the Court of Appeals found that these
included only SBM's resort facilities but not gambling facilities. SBM 1I, 329 F.3d at 365.
SBMI, 192 F. Supp. 2dat471.
Id.
SBM 11, 329 F.3d at 361; SBMI, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 471.
SBM 1, 192 F. Supp. 2d 471.
SBM H, 329 F.3d at 361.
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company's worldwide marketing efforts.3 Consistent with the volume of their
marketing activity, approximately twenty-two percent of SBM's customers in
Monaco are from North America.32 However, SBM does not operate casino or
gambling facilities within U.S. territory. "
B. History and Operationsof PlaintiffCompanies
The plaintiffs-appellants are five companies: International Bancorp, LLC,
International Services. Inc., International Lotteries, LLC, Las Vegas Sportsbook,
Inc. and Britannia Finance Corporation 34 (hereinafter referred to as "plaintiff
companies"). All plaintiff companies are owned, controlled, and operated by
Claude Levy,35 a French national 6 residing in Belgium,3 and are not affiliated
with SBM.38
The plaintiff companies are in the business of developing and operating
websites related to online gambling.39 They operate about 150 web sites devoted
to online gambling.' Fifty-three of those websites were found to incorporate
41
some portion of the term "Casino de Monte Carlo" in their domain name.
Domain names registered for the plaintiff companies included "casinomonte
carlo.com" and "montecarlocasinos.com.,, 4' These two sites, which were found to
be of prominent significance to the plaintiff companies' online gambling
activities, comprised of pages describing their online gambling services and
containing pictures and graphics of the interior of a casino that appeared to be a
copy of SBM's Casino de Monte Carlo. 43 The sites provided the opportunity to
download the plaintiff companies' online gaming software, entitled "Casino de
Monte Carlo." Along with providing the gambling software, the websites
displayed pictures of SBM's Casino de Monte Carlo's exterior and interior and
alluded to the geographic location of Monte Carlo. In so doing, the websites
implied that they offer online gambling services as an alternative to the plaintiff

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

SBMI, 192 F. Supp. 2d at471.
Id.
Id.
SBM 1I, 329 F.3d at 361; SBM 1, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 472.
SBM 1, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 472.
SBM I1, 329 F.3d at 361.
SBM I, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 472.
SBM II, 329 F.3d at 361; SBM 1, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 472.
SBM , 192 F. Supp. 2d at 472-475.
SBM 11, 329 F.3d at 361.
Id.
SBM 1, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 473; SBM 11, 329 F.3d at 361.
SBM 1, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 474.
Id.
Id.
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companies' Monaco casino, though the plaintiff operates no such facility.46 The
websites further alluded to SBM,4 including a greeting card that read "Welcome
to Casino de Monte Carlo," pictures of the outside of SBM's Casino de Monte
Carlo, and statements that the casino was owned and managed by a group of
corporations who have been in the business "for more than 140 years. 4 8 In
addition, they included extensive descriptions of the Principality of Monaco. 9
Neither Levy nor any of the plaintiff companies hold any registered trademarks
using the terms "Casino," "Monaco," or "Monte Carlo" in one form or another."
None of the plaintiff companies' websites criticizes or parodies SBM or any of
its facilities, nor do they disclaim any commercial affiliation.'
All plaintiff companies are substantially undercapitalized and have no
officers, directors, or members (other than Levy and his wife), no employees, and
essentially no corporate records.52 Furthermore, some of the plaintiff companies
were found to have neither offices, bank accounts, nor ever to have filed a tax
return in any jurisdiction. 3 Although the plaintiff companies purport to be
distinct entities they have a common leadership, common goals, and work
together with a common purpose."
C. ProceduralBackground
In this litigation, the plaintiff companies sought a declaratory judgment as to
whether they are entitled to use the term "Casino de Monte Carlo" in their
domain names. 55 SBM challenges the registration and use of the fifty-three
56
domain names that incorporate the mark "CASINO DE MONTE CARLO,

claiming the use of the mark by the plaintiff companies misleads consumers by
creating the false impression that plaintiffs' websites are somehow affiliated with
SBM.57
1. ProceedingsBefore the WIPO Arbitrationand Mediation Panel
When registering each of the disputed fifty-three domain names, the plaintiff
companies agreed to arbitrate any dispute regarding ownership of the domain

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

SBM 11,
329 F.3d at 361.
SBM 1,192 F. Supp. 2d at 474.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 472.
ld. at 472-74.
Id. at 472.
Id. at 470, 475-76.
Id.
Id. at 475-76.
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names in accordance with the Uniform Policy for Domain Name Dispute
Resolution ("UDRP"), adopted by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Nambers. ("ICANN")." When SBM learned of the plaintiff companies' use
of the "CASINO DE MONTE CARLO" mark on their websites, it filed
59
complaints with the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO")
pursuant to the UDRP against four of the plaintiff companies, challenging the use
6
of the disputed domain names. 6° In four substantially identical decisions, ' the
Administrative Panel of the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center ruled
against the plaintiff companies. 62 The Panel found that the domain names used by
the plaintiff companies, which incorporated the term "Casino de Monte Carlo" as
such and in different variations,63 were identical or confusingly similar to SBM's
mark, 6' plaintiff companies had no legitimate right or interest in the mark
65
"CASINO DE MONTE CARLO" or in respect of the domain names, and the
disputed domain names were registered and used by the plaintiff companies in
bad faith. 6 Accordingly, the panel required that the registration of all fifty-three
or related to the term "Casino de Monte Carlo" be
domain-names including
67
SBM.
to
transferred
2. ProceedingsBefore the District Court
To escape the decision of the WIPO Administrative Panel, the plaintiff
companies filed a complaint in Federal District Court against SBM, seeking a
declaratory judgment that they are entitled to retain ownership in the disputed
68
domain names. SBM counterclaimed for trademark infringement, trademark
cyber-squatting and unfair competition, 69 SBM sought statutory damages
dilution,
in the amount of $100,000 for each of the contested domain names, the transfer

58. Id. at 475.
59. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Estrangers a Monaco v. Britannia Finance, Case No. D20001315, WIPO ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION CENTER, available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/
html/2000/d2000-1315.html; Societe des Bains de Meret du Cercie des Estrangers a Monaco v. Bancorp Europe, Case
No. D2000-1323, WIPO ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION CENTER, available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/
decisions/htmlt2000/d2000-1323.htnl; Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Estrangers a Monaco v. International
Lotteries, Case No. D2000-1327, WIPO ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION CENTER, available at http://arbiter.
wipo.int/domains/decisions/htmll2000/d2000-1327.html; Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Estrangers a
Monaco v. International Services, Inc., Case No. D2000-1328, WIPO ARBrrRATION AND MEDIATION CENTER,
available at httpJ/arbiter.wipo.int/domains/ decisions/ htnl/2000/d2000-1328.htnl.
60. SBM 1, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 475; SBM l, 329 F.3d at 361.
61. SBMl,192 F. Supp. 2d at 475.
62. See supra note 59 and cases cited therein.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. SBM 1, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 475; SBM ll, 329 F.3d at 361.
69. SBM 1, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 475; SBM 11, 329 F.3d at 361-62.
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of each of the domain names, and an injunction enjoining the plaintiff companies
and Levy from registering domain names incorporating the term "Casino de
Monte Carlo" or similar terms and from using the term "Casino Monte Carlo" on
the internet.7 °
The District Court ruled against SBM on its unfair competition claim, as well
as on its trademark dilution claim, holding SBM had failed to show that the use
of the term "Casino de Monte Carlo" by the plaintiff companies had caused them
any economic harm. 7' However, the District Court granted summary judgment in
favor of SBM on its trademark infringement and cyber-squatting claims ordering
that forty-three of the fifty-three 72 disputed domain names be transferred to
SBM, 73 and awarding SBM $ 51,000 in statutory damages. 74 The court had no
trouble finding that the plaintiff companies used the mark in commerce75 and in
connection with the sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services76 and
that they did so in a manner that was likely to confuse consumers. Relying on
Larsen v. Terk Technologies Corp.,78 the court initially pointed out that U.S.
trademark law generally protects foreign nationals who own marks protectible
under American law. 79 The court noted that the fact that the process of registering
SBM's "CASINO DE MONTE CARLO" trademark in the federal register had
not yet been completed was not fatal to SBM's claim. 0 Under U.S. trademark
law, a mark is protected against infringement even when the mark is not federally
registered,8 ' as long as the mark-holder succeeds in establishing that the mark is
distinctive and has been used in American commerce." Applying the definition
provided by 15 U.S.C. § 1127, the court held that a mark is used in commerce:
[W]hen it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services and
the services are rendered in commerce, or the services are rendered in
more than one State or in the United States and a foreign country and the
person rendering the services is engaged in commerce in connection with
the services...

70. SBM 1, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 475-76.
71. Id. at 484.
72. Id. at 491 (Ten of the contested domain names did not incorporate the term "Casino de Monte
Carlo," but merely the geographic description "Monte Carlo").
73. Id. at 491-92.
74. Id. at 490-91.
75. Id. at 478-79.
76. Id. at 478.
77. Id. at 478, 482-83.
78. Larsen v. Terk Technologies Corp., 151 F.3d 140 (4th Cir. 1998).
79. SBM I, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 478.
80. Id. at 479.
81. Id. (citing Perini Corp. v. Perini Construction., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 124 (4th Cir. 1990).)
82. Id. (citing Washington Speakers Bureau, Inc. v. Leading Authorities, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 488, 494
(E.D. Va. 1999), aff'd, 217 F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 2000).)
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The court understood "commerce" as being commerce that may be lawfully
regulated by Congress.83 Although the court noted that the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit has determined that the mere advertisement of a mark in
the United States, however extensive, does not establish "use" in American
commerce,84 it acknowledged that this was essentially not an advertising case."
Rather, the court held that SBM had used its "CASINO DE MONTE CARLO"
mark in U.S. commerce 86 because customers could book reservations from its
New York office."' Thus, the District Court held that services were rendered in
the United States. 8 Yet the court failed to enter into any further inquiries as to
whether reservations from SBM's New York office could be made for the
"Casino de Monte Carlo." Consequently, it never addressed the issue of whether
a mark is "used in commerce" when it is advertised in the United States attached
to services rendered solely in a foreign country and purchased by United States
citizens in that country.
3. Proceedingsbefore the Court of Appeals
89
The plaintiff companies appealed the District Court's judgment, claiming
the court erred in holding that SBM had a protectible interest in the "CASINO
DE MONTE CARLO" mark. 9° The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
District Court in a split decision, 9' holding that the District Court was right to
arrive at the conclusion to grant summary judgment to SBM on its trademark
infringement and cyber-squatting claims. 92 However, the Court of Appeals
rejected the District Court's reasoning and grounded its decision on a completely

different approach.

a.

9'

The Majority Opinion

The appellate court's reasoning is based on the assumption that as a
prerequisite for its infringement claim to be successful, SBM must have a
94
protectible interest in the "CASINO DE MONTE CARLO" mark. Since the

83. SBM 1, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 475.
84. Id. (citing to Buti v. Perosa, S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir. 1998); Morningside Group Ltd. v.
Momingside Capital Group L.L.C., 182 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 1999)).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 480.
87. Id. at 479.
88. Id. at 479-80.
89. SBM H, 329 F.3d at 361.
90. Id. at 363.
91. Id.at 383.
92. Id.at 361.
93. Id.at 361-82.
94. Id. at 363.
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mark is not registered under U.S. law, it must be used in commerce in order to be
protected under the Lanham Act. 95 After stating that "commerce" within the
meaning of the Lanham Act incorporates all commerce that Congress may
lawfully regulate, 96 the court turned to the question of what exactly constitutes
"use in commerce" within the meaning of the Lanham Act.97 To determine
when
exactly a mark is "used" in commerce, the court reverted to the definition
provided by the Lanham Act 15 U.S.C. § 1127:
The term use in commerce means the bona fide use of a mark in the
ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a
mark. For purposes of this chapter, a mark shall be deemed to be used in
commerce... on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or
advertising of services and the services are rendered in commerce, or the
services are rendered in more than one State or in the United Sates and a
foreign country and the person rendering the services is engaged in
commerce in connection with the services. 98
From this definition the court extracted a two-pronged test to determine
whether a mark has been used in commerce. 99 With respect to services, "use in
commerce" occurs when:
(1) a mark is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services, and
(2) the services are rendered in commerce.'0
The court concluded that as a consequence of this conjunctive command,' 0' it
is not enough for a mark owner simply to render services in foreign commerce,
or simply to use or display the mark in the sale or advertising of services to
United States consumers. 02 To be eligible for protection under U.S. trademark
law, both elements have to be met, and both elements have to be distinctly
analyzed.' 3
The court then turned to the core issue of this case, assessing whether SBM
had used the "CASINO DE MONTE CARLO" mark in commerce. '°' There was
no question that SBM displayed its "CASINO DE MONTE CARLO" mark in the
United States since SBM conducted various promotional efforts under the mark
95. SBM II, 329 F.3d at 363.
96. Id. at 364.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 383. The two-pronged test applied by the Court of Appeals originates in pre Lanham Act
trademark-cases.
100. Id. at 364.
101. Id, at 373.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 364.
104. Id. at 361,364.
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from its New York office.' 5 However, the parties disagreed on whether the
activities conducted by SBM under the "CASINO DE MONTE CARLO" mark
from its New York office constituted "services rendered in interstate commerce"
within the meaning of the Lanham Act.' 6 SBM claimed that by providing for the
booking of reservations, it rendered services in commerce. In addition, by
maintaining the office, advertising its services, and maintaining its promotional
website etc., the mark was attached to the services.' °7 Thereby, SBM argued it
8
satisfied the "use in commerce" requirement.' The plaintiff companies
countered SBM's claim by arguing its customers could not book reservations to
SBM's casino facilities from its New York office." 9 Reservations could only be
made for SBM's other facilities, such as resorts."0 The "CASINO DE MONTE
CARLO" trademark, however, applies only to SBM's gambling services, and
these services were rendered in Monaco, not in the United States."' Therefore,
2
the office engaged in no other activity than mere advertising, which is3 generally
requirement."
regarded as insufficient to satisfy the "use in commerce"
While the District Court followed SBM's argument," 4 the Court of Appeals
found the record showed that from SBM's New York office reservations could be
5
made only for the resort facilities, but not for the casino." Since the mark in
question applied only to the casino, ' 6 and all activities of the New York office
other than the reservations have to be regarded as merely promotional,' the
Court of Appeals held that SBM's activities in their New York office were mere
8
advertising and therefore, of no relevance to resolving the case." Accordingly,
the court concluded that since SBM did not present any evidence that the New
York office did anything other than advertise the "CASINO DE MONTE
CARLO" mark, the plaintiff companies would have the better argument if the
case rested on this alone." 9
Yet the court chose a different approach. According to the court's majority,
the key fact in this case is that U.S. citizens went to and gambled at SBM's

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
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casino facilities in Monaco.' 20 This piece of information alone, which was not in
dispute between the parties,'"' formed the basis of the court's holding that foreign
trade was present in this case. Therefore, "commerce" had occurred within the
22
meaning of the Lanham Act.
In its analysis, the court first provided its understanding of "foreign trade". It
identified "foreign trade" as trade between subjects of the United States and
subjects of a foreign nation, not limited to traffic, buying and selling, or the
interchange of commodities but also incorporating all sorts of commercial
intercourse, including service transactions. 23 Based on this definition of foreign
trade, the court drew the conclusion that the promotional activities conducted by
SBM in its New York office did not by itself constitute "foreign trade", and
therefore was not "use in commerce."'

24

However, the "CASINO DE MONTE

CARLO" mark was used in commerce since U.S. citizens traveled to and
gambled at the casino facilities operated by SBM,
25 the subject of a foreign nation,
thereby constituting trade with a foreign nation.'
b.

The Dissenting Opinion

The majority's reasoning was not supported unanimously. Judge Diana
Gribbon Motz delivered a dissenting opinion strongly advocating a more
conventional understanding of "use in commerce.' 26 Judge Motz followed the
majority's holding that for a mark to be "used in commerce," a service must be
rendered in commerce and a mark must be used or displayed in the sale or
advertising of that service.'27 She also agreed that "commerce" within the
meaning of the Lanham Act is commerce that Congress may lawfully regulate,
and the rendering of gambling services to U.S. citizens in Monaco constituted
commerce under the Lanham Act.' 28 Furthermore, Judge Motz did not question
that SBM formally and intentionally used and displayed its "CASINO DE
MONTE CARLO" mark in the sale and advertising of its services to U.S.
citizens in the United States.'2 9 In her opinion, however, this was not enough to
grant the mark protection under the Lanham Act. 3
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Relying on an abundance of cases, 3' the dissent asserted that both elements
of the two-pronged "use in commerce" test must be met within the geographic
borders of the United States.' She concluded that because SBM had not
rendered its casino services in the United States, it had not satisfied the statutory
"use in commerce" requirement and was, therefore, not eligible to Lanham Act
33
protection for its "CASINO DE MONTE CARLO" mark.' The dissent argued
that the majority's opinion would extend the protection of United States
34
trademark law to marks used exclusively abroad. The dissent claimed that
consequently, any entity that uses a mark to advertise and sell its goods or
services to U.S. citizens in a foreign country would be eligible for trademark
protection under U.S. law.'35 If the majority's opinion were adopted, like "some sort
of foreign influenza,"' 3 6 U.S. trademark rights would accompany American travelers
38
on their way home,' and in a surge of "reversed imperialism,"' 39foreign subjects
trademarks."'
would "colonize American markets with their foreign
c.

The Majority's Review of the Dissent'sArguments

When directly addressing the arguments brought forward by the dissent, the
4°
majority found them to be based on three major errors:' First, instead of
4
analyzing both elements of the two-pronged "use in commerce" test' ' distinctly,
42
the dissent conflated them into one. Only on the basis of this conflation did the
dissent come to the conclusion that both elements must occur within the
geographic borders of the United States.13 Second, the dissent relied on precedent
that does not control the case.'" In assessing the cases that the dissenting judge cited
in support of her opinion, the majority found them to be either not on point or (as to

131. SBM H, 329 F.2d at 383-98 (citing to Buti v. Impressa Perosa, S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 1998));
Rivard v. Linville, 133 F.3d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Person's Co., Ltd. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir.
1990); Imperial Tobacco, Ltd. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 899 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1990); The Morningside Group
Ltd. v. Morningside Capital Group, L.L.C., 182 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 1999); Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Shinohara
Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591 540 (5th Cir. 1985); CBS, Inc. v. Logical Games, 719 F.2d 1237 (4th
Cir. 1983); La Societe Anonyme des Parfums le Galion v. Jean Patou, Inc., 495 F.2d 1265 (2d Cir. 1974)).
132. SBM H, 329 F.3d at 383.
133. Id.
134. Id.at 384.
135. id. at 388.
136. Id. at 389.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 372.
141. The two prongs are: (1) a mark is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services, and (2)
the services are rendered in commerce; see also supra note 100 and accompanying text.
142. SBM H,329 F.3d at 372.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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two cases decided by the TTAB14 5 which held that both elements of the two pronged
"use in commerce" test must be met within the territory of the United States rejected
their reasoning. 46 Third, the dissent relied on unpersuasive policy arguments.' 7 The

majority admitted to not putting great weight on policy, but contends that the ultimate
goal of trademark law is the prevention of consumer confusion, which it found to be
48
better served by its own rule.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Overview: Protectionof ForeignTrademarks under UnitedStates Law
Trademark law protects foreign nationals who own marks protectible under
American law. ' As a general rule, however, foreign trademarks are protected by
U.S. trademark law only if they have been used in the United States.'50 Foreign
marks that are not "used" in the United States may only be protected if the mark
is "famous" or "well known" in the United States, or if the foreign mark owner
meets the requirements of section 44 of the Lanham Act.'"' Section 44 provides
that if a foreign mark owner's country is a party to the Paris Convention" and
the mark owner already has or applied for a trademark registration in that
country, the foreign mark owner may obtain U.S. registration without proving
actual use in the United States. '"' Yet the mark-owner still has to state a bona fide
intention to use the mark in the United States.i The foreign applicant may then
secure priority by obtaining the filing date of his foreign application as the
55
effective filing date in the United States.
There can be little doubt that SBM's "CASINO DE MONTE CARLO" mark
is neither famous nor well known in the United States. In fact, SBM never made
that claim. Section 44 of the Lanham Act also provides no relief for SBM.
SBM's problem is not in obtaining a better priority for its registration or in
obtaining a registration at all. To enjoin the plaintiff companies from using the
term "Casino de Monte Carlo" with immediate effect, SBM has to show actual
"use" of its mark before the process of registration is completed.
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B. Analysis of Precedent
The dissent in InternationalBankcorp alleges that courts of different circuits
as well as the U.S. Trademark Trial & Appeal Board ("TTAB") ruled that use of
a trademark in connection with goods and services sold only in a foreign country
56
by a foreign entity does not constitute "use" of the mark in the United States.
All of these cases accent the concept of territoriality in trademark law, stressing
that trademark rights exist in each country solely according to that country's
statutory scheme'57 and that foreign use of a trademark is ineffective to create
trademark rights in the United States. 5 From these decisions the dissent infers
that in order to be granted protection under the Lanham Act, a mark must be
displayed or advertised in the United States and the services to which the mark
attaches must be rendered within the territory of the United States.' 9 Reviewing
each of the cases individually,' 6° the majority found them either to be not on
point'6' or rejected their reasoning.' 62 Since the precedent forms an integral part of
both the majority's and the dissent's reasoning, they deserve a closer look with
regard to whether they support one or the other position.
1. Buti v. Impressa Perosa,S.R.L.
One of the key cases in this area is Buti v. Impressa Perosa,S.R.L. 63In Buti,
the court had to decide the right to use the mark "FASHION CAFt" for
restaurant services in the United States.'" The defendant had opened an
establishment in Italy under the name "Fashion Caff" and had registered the
trademark in that country.' 65 Yet, the defendant never operated any such
establishment in the United States. l6 Moreover, the defendant never conducted
any formal advertising or public relations campaign in the United States to
promote its establishment in Italy.'67 However, the defendant informally
promoted his company's business in the United States by distributing T-Shirts,
cards, and key chains with the "Fashion Caff" name and logo.'6 Subsequently,
156. SBM 11,
329 F.3d at 383.
157. Person's Co., Ltd. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Fuji Photo Film Co. v.
Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591, 599 (5th Cir. 1985).
158. La Societe Anonyme des Parfums le Galion v. Jean Patou, Inc., 495 F.2d 1265, 1270 (2d Cir.
1974).
159. SBM 11,
329 F.3d at 383-88.
160. Id. at 372-81.
161. See id. at 372 (noting court decisions).
162. See id. (discussing TTAB decisions).
163. Buti v. Impressa Perosa, S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 1998).
164. Id. at 99.
165. Id. at 100.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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the plaintiff opened a restaurant in the United States under the name "Fashion
Cafd."' 6 9 Plaintiff filed an action for declaratory judgment

regarding the

defendant's rights in the name "Fashion Cafd" for restaurant services in the
United States.'"
The court held that the plaintiff first used the contested mark in "commerce"
within the meaning of the Lanham Act.' 7' The court found that defendant's efforts
in the United States to advertise and promote its restaurant were insufficient to
satisfy the statutory standard for use in commerce.7 7 The court stated that the
defendant's mere advertising of the "FASHION CAFE" mark alone did not
constitute "use" of the mark in commerce. 73 Next, the court assessed whether the
defendant's promotional activities in the United States merited Lanham Act
protection for its mark based on the ongoing business of its establishment in
Milan.14 The court answered in the negative. 5 Absent proof that the defendant
rendered any restaurant services in U.S. commerce, the court held that the
defendant's activities in the United7 States
were insufficient to establish "use" of
6
the contested mark "in commerce."'
The dissent in InternationalBancorp analogized the facts of their case to
Buti. Like InternationalBancorp the defendant in Buti displayed its mark by
advertising its business to U.S. consumers in the United States, but only rendered
services abroad. 77 The majority, however, rejected Buti as not on point.'7 First,
the majority made an attempt to distinguish Buti by saying that unlike
International Bancorp, the foreign user in Buti conceded that the services he
offered formed no part of the trade between Italy and the United States, and
therefore, did not constitute foreign trade. 79 Consequently, the Buti court did not
address the application of the Lanham Act to foreign trade.' 80 Moreover, the
majority argued it was not clear whether the foreign user in Buti used its mark in
foreign trade, since the restaurant conducted no formal advertising or public
relations campaign aimed at U.S. citizens.'' As opposed to the foreign trademark
owner in Buti, SBM has advertised its mark systematically and at great cost to
U.S. consumers.182

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id.
Id. at 100-01.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 101-02.
Id. at 102.
Id. at 103-04.
Id. at 103.
Id.
SBM 1I, 329 F.3d 359, 383 (4th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 372.
Id. at 369.
Id.
Id. at 369-70.
Id. at 370.

The TransnationalLawyer / Vol. 17

2. Person's Co. v. Christman
The dissent also put great weight on another key case in this area, Person's
Co. Ltd. v. Christman."3 In Person's,the court had to determine whether certain
commercial activities the plaintiff had conducted abroad were sufficient to
establish Lanham Act protection for a mark in the United States. Plaintiff was in
the business of selling clothing items under the "PERSON'S" mark in his native
Japan.' Among its customers were some U.S. citizens." ' The defendant, after
visiting one of plaintiff's retail stores in Japan, started her own company in the
United States, which manufactured and sold similar merchandise under the
"PERSON'S" logo. 8 6 The plaintiff later expanded its business to the United
States and sued the defendant for trademark infringement.'87 The court denied the
plaintiff's claim on the grounds that the use of the mark in Japan had no effect on
United States commerce, and therefore, did not establish priority to merit
protection in the United States.'88
The dissent argued that the Person's court affirmed the rule that trademarks
exist in each country solely according to that country's statutory scheme.'89
Moreover, Person's showed that foreign use of a mark was not sufficient to merit
Lanham Act protection, even if U.S. citizens purchased goods or services abroad
from a subject of a foreign nation. '9° The majority, however, found Person's not
to be on point either.' 9' Its major argument was that, unlike in the case at issue
here, the plaintiff in Person's never used or displayed its mark to advertise or sell
its products in the United States and tried to establish priority solely on the basis
of its Japanese operations.'9'
3. Imperial Tobacco, Ltd. v. PhilipMorris, Inc.
Seeking support for her position, the dissent also relied' 93 on Imperial
Tobacco, Ltd. v. Philip Morris, Inc.'9 In Imperial Tobacco, the plaintiff, a U. K.
corporation, owned a trademark registration in the Principal Register, which it
obtained on the basis of a prior registration of the mark in the United Kingdom in
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accordance with section 44 (e) of the Lanham Act.' 9 However, plaintiff made no
sales under the registered mark in the United States' 96 and made no use of the
mark in commerce "in or with the United States."' 97 After the expiration of the

statutory term, the defendant filed a petition to cancel the plaintiffs registration
on the grounds that the plaintiff had abandoned his mark.'9" The court ruled in
favor of the defendant.' 99 It found a prima facie case of abandonment based on the
fact that plaintiff did not use its mark in the United States for more than two
years. 2 The court held that plaintiff's foreign sales under the mark abroad were
irrelevant; "use" within the meaning of the Lanham Act meant use in the United
States.2' The dissent alleged Imperial Tobacco supported the contention that
''use" of a mark must occur in the United States in order to merit protection under
the Lanham Act.2°2 The majority argued that the Imperial Tobacco court never
addressed the essential facts of if and to what extent the contested mark was
advertised in the United States or to U.S. consumers, or if and to what extent the
goods to which the mark was attached were purchased by U.S. consumers
abroad.2 3
As opposed to Imperial Tobacco, SBM "used" the "CASINO DE MONTE
CARLO" mark "in advertising and displays, 204 in the United States and attached
it to services rendered in "qualifying commerce ' '205 overseas. Moreover, the
majority argued, Imperial Tobacco supports the majority's position rather than
that of the dissent.2 6 The majority pointed to the court's factual notation that "no
use of the mark in commerce in or with the United States '207 had occurred. 2°s This
notation implied that different forms of commerce could support trademark

195. Id. at 1577 § 44 (noting that the Lanham Act provides that if a foreign mark owner's country is a
party to the Paris Convention and the mark owner has, or has applied for, a trademark registration in that
country, the foreign mark owner may obtain a U.S. registration without proving actual use in the United States
by stating a bona fide intention to use the mark in the United States. The foreign applicant may then secure
priority by obtaining the filing date of his foreign application as the effective filing date in the United States.
MCCARTHY, supra note 4 § 19:73.
196. Imperial Tobacco, 899 F.2d at 1577.
197. Id.
198. Id. The right to use a registered mark is subject to the defense that the mark has been abandoned by
the registrant. See 15 USCS § II 5(b)(2).
199. Imperial Tobacco, 899 F.2d at 1577.
200. Id. at 1579. The case was decided in 1990. The statutory period is now three years. See 15
U.S.C.A. § 1127.
201. Imperial Tobacco, 899 F.2d at 1579.
202. SBM 11, 329 F.3d 359 at 387.
203. Id. at 375.
204. Id. at 376. In making this statement, the majority decides not to clearly distinguish between "use"
of a mark and advertising of a mark.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 375.
207. Imperial Tobacco, Ltd v. Phillip Morris. Inc., 899 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
208. SBM 11, 329 F.3d at 375.
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protection.2° Commerce in the United States, the majority concluded, is not the
only commerce that can satisfy the Lanham Act, but commerce with the United
States is also implicated.2 °
4. Rivard v. Linville
Relying on Rivard v. Linville21 1 (Rivard I1), the dissent in International
Bancorp alleged that the Federal Circuit had embraced a rule that "use in
commerce" must occur within the United States, which the dissent believed
directly conflicted with the majority's opinion."'
Rivard II, which relied heavily on Imperial Tobacco, concerned a dispute
over the right to use the mark "ULTRACUTS" for hair and beauty salons in the
United States. Rivard, the respondent in the initial TTAB dispute and later
appellant, had registered his mark "ULTRACUTS" in connection with hair
dressing and beauty salon services based on his prior registration of the mark in
Canada."3 He successfully operated a chain of hair and beauty salons in Canada
but did not offer any such services in the United States."' Petitioner and later
appellee, Linville, filed a petition to the TTAB to cancel respondent's
"ULTRACUTS" mark, alleging it was confusingly similar to his own mark and
respondent had abandoned it by not using it in the United States commerce for
two years. 25 Respondent admitted he personally made no sales of hairdressing
and beauty salon services under the mark in the United States.2 6 Yet, he claimed
he still used the mark in United States commerce because he advertised his
beauty salons on radio stations that could be heard both in Canada and in the
United States, as well as in Canadian newspapers that he believed were also read
by U.S. citizens.1 7 Moreover, respondent claimed that his business attracted
customers from the United States, who purchased hair dressing services and hair
products at his facilities. 2 8
The TrAB ruled in favor of the petitioner, rejecting respondent's argument9
21
that he had used the mark in U.S. commerce "through his advertising.,
Moreover, the TTAB held that U.S. residents' purchases of services at
respondent's Canadian facilities did not constitute "use" of the mark in U.S
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commerce. 220 On appeal from the TTAB, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit found that the appellee established a prima facie case that the appellant
abandoned the "ULTRACUTS" mark because he did not use it in connection
with hair dressing and beauty services in the United States. 22' "Use" of a
trademark, the court implied, meant use in the United States.22
The dissent relied on Rivard 1I to argue that in order for a service mark to
qualify for U.S. trademark protection, the services to which the mark attaches
must be rendered in commerce in the United States.22 ' The majority, however,
argued that both the TTAB and the Court of Appeals never directly addressed the
issue whether the respondent-appellant's promotional activities in the United
States, in connection with sales to American consumers abroad, were sufficient
to merit Lanham Act protection for his "ULTRACUTS" mark.224 The majority
argued that the TTAB rejected the respondent's position solely on the grounds
that no qualifying commerce was present but failed to address the issue of
whether the mark had been "used" in commerce within the meaning of the
Lanham Act. 225 The Court of Appeals never even considered the mark owner's
claim that his servicing of United States consumers and his United States
advertising constituted "use in commerce," but solely relied on a prior
unpublished opinion. 226 As in Imperial Tobacco, the Rivard H court did not
address the issue of if and to what extent the services to which the mark was
attached were purchased by U.S. consumers in Canada.227 Therefore, the majority
concluded, Rivard I was unable to support the dissent.
5. Fuji Photo
The dissent in International Bancorp also relied on Fuji Photo Film
Company, Inc. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha.229 In Fuji, two Japanese
corporations litigated over the right to use the trademark "FUJI" on graphic arts
equipment and supplies in the United States.23 ° After both companies had sold
their products in Japan for some time, they expanded their business to the United
States.' Holding that the parties' foreign use of their respective "FUJI"

220. Id. at 14.
221. Rivard, 133 F.3d at 1449.
222. Id.
223. SBM II, 329 F.3d 359, 387-88 (4 Cir. 2003).
224. Id. at 376.
225. Id. at 376.
226. Id. at 376.
227. See generally Rivard, 133 F.3d 1446.
228. SBM 1H,329 F.3d at 376.
229. See generally Fuji Photo Film Company, Inc. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591
(5th Cir. 1985).
230. id. at 593.
231. Id.
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trademarks was ineffectual to create trademark rights in the United States, the
court excluded evidence of the parties' foreign trademark practices from its
analysis.232 The dissent argued that according to Fuji, use of a foreign mark in a
foreign country could not grant the foreign holder priority over one who used the
mark first in the United States.233 Yet the majority rejected Fuji for the same
reason it rejected Person S.234 It distinguished Fuji by saying that unlike in the
case at issue here, Fuji concerned non-qualifying commerce and35 foreign use
and display of the mark to advertise and sell products to foreign consumers.236
6. La Societe Anonyme des Parfums
The dissent in InternationalBancorp also looked to La Societe Anonyme des
Parfums le Galion v. Jean Patou, Inc.237 to find support for its position. In La
Societe Anonyme, the plaintiff, a French perfume manufacturer, used the mark
238
"SNOB" for its perfume in a number of countries other than the United States.
The plaintiff was unable to sell the product in the United States because the
defendant, an American perfume manufacturer, obtained a U.S. trademark
registration for "SNOB" and U.S. customs subsequently refused to permit the
import of plaintiff's products to the United States.239 In this context, the court
ruled that the plaintiffs foreign use was ineffectual to create trademark rights in
the United States.240 Again, the majority rejected the dissent's argument on the
same grounds it had rejected Person's and Fuji.24' In La Societe Anonyme, the
majority contended, plaintiff attached its trademark to products it manufactured
abroad, advertised abroad to foreigners, and sold abroad to foreigners.242 This, the
majority found, was non-qualifying commerce and foreign use and display of the
mark to advertise and sell the product to foreign consumers, dissimilar to the
243
facts of the present case.
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7. Morningside Group v. Morningside Capital
Although factually dissimilar, the dissent in InternationalBancorp also cited
to The Morningside Group Limited v. Morningside CapitalGroup, L.L.C.2" The
object in this case was a dispute over the right to use the service mark
"MORNINGSIDE" in the United States." 5 Plaintiff Morningside Group, who ran a
Hong Kong based financial business and was engaged in various financial activities
in the United States, selected the mark "MORNINGSIDE" to identify its institution.
Defendant Momingside Capital was a Connecticut based private equity investment
group that conducted its business under the same mark.2 46 The District Court found
that plaintiff did not provide services within the meaning of the Lanham Act and,
therefore, did not have a valid service mark. 7 The Court of Appeals reversed. 8
In its reasoning, the court distinguished Buti on the basis that unlike the plaintiff
in Morningside, the Buti-claimant did not provide its actual services in the United
States, but only advertised and promoted them in the United States.24 9 Mere
advertising and promotion of a mark in the United States, the court held, were not
enough to constitute "use" of the mark "in commerce".
The dissent argued that Morningside shows the Second Circuit's intent that
trademark protection under the Lanham Act should only be granted where the
mark claimant conducted material aspects of its services in the United States,
thereby satisfying the "use in commerce" requirement.2' The majority, however,
interpreted Morningside in an entirely different way. 52 It expressly agreed with
the court's statement that mere advertising of a mark in the United States was not
enough to constitute "use" of the mark "in commerce," but pointed to the court's
conclusion that further inquiry had to be made as to whether the advertising and
promotion undertaken in the United States was conjoined with qualifying
commerce. 213 Therefore, the majority concluded Morningside could not support
the dissent's position. 254
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8. CBS v. Logical Games
The dissent in International Bancorp also relied on CBS Inc. v. Logical
Games.255 In this case, the plaintiff, distributor of "Rubik's Cube," sued the
distributor of an identical puzzle "Magic Cube," alleging trademark
infringement, unfair copying of trade dress, and other claims.256
The plaintiff's puzzle, widely known to U.S. consumers under its "RUBIK'S
CUBE" trademark, was invented in 1975 by Erno Rubik, a native and resident of
Hungary.257 In 1978, the principal of defendant Logical Games, while on a visit to
Hungary, saw examples of the puzzle, realized its sales potential in the United
States and ordered 3000 puzzles from its Hungarian manufacturer Konsumex.25
By February 1980, all 3000 puzzles had been sold in the United States. 59 In
February or March 1980, CBS's predecessor in interest, who had entered an
exclusive distribution agreement with Konsumex, began the importation of the
26
puzzle to the United States, accompanied by a massive advertising campaign. 0
By 1983, CBS had sold a total of 16,000,000 puzzles.2 6 ' Defendant contended
that due to its 1978 purchase in Hungary and subsequent sale of 3000 puzzles in
the United States, it had an exclusive right to the puzzle trade dress.2 6 The CBS
court acknowledged that factual situations could be imagined in which extensive
purchases abroad and marketing in the United States could create trade dress
rights in the U.S. for a format employed elsewhere by a foreign manufacturer, but
found defendant's purchase and resale of 3000 puzzles too minimal to establish
such rights.263 Citing La Societe Anonyme, the court accepted the assertion that
trade dress use in foreign countries does not create protectible trademark rights in
the United States. 264 However, the court based its decision primarily on the
holding that the purchase and resale of only 3000 puzzles was insufficient to
create trade dress rights, no matter where or when they occurred, without further
addressing the issue of whether and when activities abroad could in any way
create trademark rights in the United States.265
Although the case is factually widely dissimilar to InternationalBancorp, the
dissent relied on CBS, for it contended it provided parallel reasoning that trade
dress use in foreign countries could not create protectible trademark rights in the

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

See CBS, Inc. v. Logical Games, 719 F.2d 1237 (4th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1237.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
ldat 1239.
Id. at 1239-1240.
Id. at 1239.
Id at 1240.

2004 / Catching the Flu-Reverse Imperialism in U.S. Trademark Law?
United States.26 6 The majority argued that CBS not only did not support the
dissent's reasoning, but explicitly rejected it.267 According to the majority
interpretation, CBS merely stated that the importer of a product could not acquire
trade dress rights in that product based on a third-party manufacturer's foreign
production of and foreign sale to foreign consumers of that product.268 Moreover,
the majority pointed to the court's dicta that in a different factual situation,
purchases abroad and marketing in the United States could create trade dress
rights in the United States for a format employed elsewhere by a foreign
manufacturer.269
9. Mother's Restaurant
Finally, the dissent in International Bancorp relied on a number of TTAB
decisions in which the TTAB consistently upheld the rule that priority of right in a
trademark in the United States depended on priority of use of the mark in the United
States and was not affected by use of the mark in another country. 270 The most relevant
TTAB decision, since it is arguably factually similar to International Bancorp, is
Mothers's RestaurantsInc. v. Mother's other Kitchen, Inc.271
In Mother's Restaurants, the applicant filed an application to register the mark
"MOTHER'S OTHER KITCHEN" for carry out restaurant services. 272 Mother's
Restaurants, Inc. opposed the registration on the grounds that the mark was confusingly
similar to its mark "MOTHER'S PIZZA PARLOUR." 73 The opposer asserted priority
of his mark on the basis of promotional activities conducted in Canada.274 He claimed
that he had advertised the mark on Canadian radio stations with signals strong enough
to reach into the United States and distributed promotional materials at tourist
information booths along tourist routes in southern Ontario.275 Moreover, the opposer
claimed that American citizens dined at his restaurants in Canada.276 Denying the
opposer's claim, the TTAB held that use and advertising of a mark in connection with
goods or services marketed in a foreign country (whether it occurs inside or outside the
United States) created no priority rights in the United States. 77
266. SBM 11, 329 F.3d 359, 385 (4th Cir. 2003).
267. Id. at 377.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 377-378.
270. Mother's Restaurants Inc. v. Mother's other Kitchen, Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1046 (TTAB
1983); Oland's Breweries, Ltd. v. Miller Brewing Co., 189 U.S.P.Q. 481 (TTAB 1975); Sterling Drug Inc. v.
Knoll AG Chemische Fabriken, 159 U.S.P.Q. 628 (TrAB 1968); Techex, Inc. v. Dvorkovitz, 220 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 81 (TTAB 1983); Stagecoach Properties Inc., v. Wells Fargo & Co, 1999 U.S.P.Q. 341 (TTAB 1978).
271. Mother's Restaurants, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1046.
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The majority acknowledged that Mother's Restaurants is factually similar to
the case at hand, but rejected the TTAB's analysis.278 The majority asserted that,
like the dissent, the TTAB did not properly distinguish the two elements of the
"use in commerce" test.279 Instead of properly applying the "use in commerce"
test, the TTAB conflated the two elements by first measuring the mark owner's
"use" of the mark through promotional activity and then measuring it by whether
it was attached to interstate commerce. 28 0 Rather, the TTAB should have first
determined whether commerce that Congress could lawfully regulate was at
issue, and subsequently address the question when the mark owners began to use
or display the mark in the advertising and sale of those qualifying services to
qualifying consumers.

211

Courts have consistently put strong emphasis on the principle of territoriality
in trademark law. They have been highly reluctant to accede to claims trying to
establish protection for foreign-owned trademarks in the United States on the
basis of some activity abroad. Across the board the courts, as well as the TTAB,
ruled that "foreign use" of a trademark does not create trademark rights in the
United States.282 In doing so, all precedent suggests a narrow interpretation of the
"use in commerce" clause when it comes to evaluating activities conducted under
a mark abroad. However, no court has ever addressed the core issue involved in
this case directly, and no court ever decided explicitly whether both elements of
the "use in commerce" test have to be met within the geographic borders of the
United States.
A number of cases cited by the dissent are factually dissimilar to the instant
case because they deal with exclusive foreign use of the contested trademark,
where both elements were met abroad, and there was little if any involvement of
United States consumers. This is especially true for Fuji, La Societe Anonyme,
Imperial Tobacco, CBS, and basically even for Person's. In Fuji, the mark was
displayed solely in Japan on products purchased only in Japan by Japanese
consumers. The same is true for La Societe Anonyme, where the mark owner
neither displayed his mark in the United States nor sold any goods to United
States consumers. Similarly, in Imperial Tobacco, there was no showing that the
contested mark was advertised in the United States, or that substantial numbers
of American consumers purchased goods the mark was attached to. In Persons,
the record showed at least one purchase of products bearing the contested mark
by an American consumer in Japan, but there was no advertising of the mark in
278. SBM H1,329 F.3d 359, 380 (4th Cir. 2003).
279. Id.
280. Id. at 380-381.
281. Id. at 380-381.
282. See Person's Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Buti v. Impressa Perosa, S.R.L.,
139 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 1998); Imperial Tobacco, Ltd. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 899 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Fuji
Photo Film Co. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1985); La Societe Anonyme des
Parfums le Galion v. Jean Patou, Inc., 495 F.2d 1265 (2d Cir. 1974); CBS, Inc. v. Logical Games, 719 F.2d
1237 (4th Cir. 1983).
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the United States nor was the advertisement directed towards the American
market. Moreover, purchases by American citizens were clearly not substantial.
CBS is also of little help to solve the problem. Its main proposition with
respect to the instant case is that where a mark is attached to a product
manufactured abroad, sold exclusively to foreign nationals abroad and not
advertised to American consumers in any way, the mark cannot be protected
under the Lanham Act. This is altogether clear. However, the CBS court rejected
the defendant's claim for other reasons. The court made clear on several
occasions that it ruled against the defendant not because the activities he
conducted abroad were insufficient, but because his later sales in the United
States were minimal. The defendant in CBS never alleged any rights in the
contested mark based on his prior use in Hungary. Accordingly, the court did not
consider whether, when, or where the defendant sold products under the
contested mark, but solely to the fact that his sales were negligible.
Morningside is also of little value . In Morningside, the contested mark was
used in the United States by both parties, and the respective services the mark
was attached to were rendered in the United States. Consequently, both marks
were protected under the Lanham Act. The sole fact that the Morningside court
distinguished Buti implies little in respect to our case. There is no dispute that
advertising alone is not sufficient to create Lanham Act protection because it
must be accompanied by qualifying commerce. That, however, was not shown by
the mark-owner.
Buti and Rivard are somewhat closer to home. Although the contested mark
in Buti was not formally advertised in the United States, it was displayed to
United States consumers in the United States. Granted, there was no evidence as
to whether and to what extent American consumers purchased services at the
mark owner's establishment in Milan, whereas in International Bancorp, there
was a massive advertising campaign conducted in the United States, and
American consumers made up a substantial number of the mark-owner's
customers. Yet, the attempt to distinguish Buti solely on that basis is not entirely
convincing. The majority's effort to distinguish the case by arguing that the
foreign user in Buti had conceded that the services he offered did not constitute
foreign trade seems rather dubious.
The majority's dealing with the TTAB's decisions in Rivard and Mother's
Restaurants is even less persuasive. Since the majority is bound to admit that
both cases are virtually factually identical to InternationalBancorp, it alludes to
technical arguments that are wholly unconvincing. The majority's contention that
the TTAB rejected the foreign mark-owner's position in Rivard solely on the
grounds that no qualifying commerce was present is simply incorrect. The TTAB
clearly stated that the fact that residents of the United States purchased the mark
owner's services while in Canada does not constitute use sufficient to obtain a
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registration in the United States.2 83 The TTAB went on to say it was a
fundamental rule that activity outside of the United States was ineffective to
create trademark rights within the United States. ' The majority's dealing with
Mother's Restaurants is even more dubious. The majority has to go out of its
way to reject the Board's reasoning on the basis of an asserted "conflation" of the
two elements of "use in commerce" test. The presentation of the TTAB's
analysis in Mother's Restaurants may not be well organized. Yet, the TTAB
unmistakably held that prior use and advertising of a mark in connection with
goods and services marketed abroad (whether the advertising occurs inside or
outside the United States) creates no priority rights in the mark in the United
States. This is undeniably a clear statement.
In sum, the majority's interpretation of the "use in commerce" clause
indicates a major shift. The TTAB as well as courts of different circuits have
promoted a much more restrictive interpretation than the one laid out in
International Bancorp. Even though many of the cases on which the dissent
relies are not precisely on point, it is fair to say that the majority steps on virgin
soil when it grants Lanham Act protection to a mark attached to services
rendered exclusively abroad.
C. The Provisions of the Lanham Act
For a full evaluation of the court's novel interpretation of the "use in
commerce" clause, it is necessary to take a closer look at the provisions of the
Lanham Act and its legislative history. First, the exact language of the Lanham
Act deserves a closer look. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 provides the following definition of
"use in commerce":
The term use in commerce means the bona fide use of a mark in the
ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a
mark. For purposes of this chapter, a mark shall be deemed to be used in
commerce ... on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or
advertising of services and the services are rendered in commerce, or the
services are rendered in more than one State or in the United Sates and a
foreign country and the person rendering the services is engaged in
commerce in connection with the services.
The dissent in International Bancorp interprets 15 U.S.C. § 1127 to mean
that both elements of the test must be met within the geographic borders of the
United States.285 The majority sees this as a "conflation" of the two elements.286
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Moreover, the majority purports that its' interpretation of the "use in commerce"
clause is supported by the "overwhelmingly clear statutory language" of the
Lanham Act.287 In fact, the language of 15 U.S.C.S. § 1127 does not make things
much clearer. The statute makes no statement as to whether one, two or any of
the elements it incorporates must be met within the geographic territory of the
' the majority sees
United States. The "overwhelmingly clear statutory language"288
to support its position is in fact highly ambiguous when it comes to the question
where the elements have to be met.
The legislative history of the Lanham Act... does not provide much support for
either position. It is apparent that when Congress enacted the Lanham Act in 1946,290
factual situations like the one underlying this case were simply unimaginable.
Whatever Congress had in mind with respect to the use of trademarks in foreign
commerce was based on a fundamentally different world economic setting. It is true
that since its enactment, the Lanham Act has been amended numerous times, 29 1 and
some of these amendments have reflected the needs of internationalization of
trademark use.292 However, none of the amendments directly addressed the question
presented by InternationalBancorp. With the development of a global economy, the
emergence of the Internet and an explosive increase in foreign travel, international
commerce has changed dramatically. Therefore, any argument based on the history
of the Lanham Act prior to 1946 can have little weight in determining the exact
meaning of the statutory language that governs the case at issue here.
D. The TerritorialityDoctrine
When analyzing the majority's interpretation of "use in commerce," one will
also have to examine its compatibility with the territoriality doctrine. The
territoriality doctrine is still widely regarded as basic to trademark law. 293 Its
main proposition is that a trademark has a separate existence in each sovereign
territory in which it is legally recognized as a mark. 294 Its function is not
necessarily to specify the origin of goods or services, but rather to symbolize the
domestic goodwill of the domestic mark-holder so that the consuming public
may rely with an expectation of consistency on the domestic reputation earned
for the mark by its owner.295 In return, the mark-owner may be confident that his
goodwill and reputation will not be injured through use of the mark by others in
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

4, § 29:10.
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Id. at 379.
Id.
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Id. § 5:4.
Id. §§ 5:5-5:11.
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domestic commerce.296 The basic assumption underlying the territoriality doctrine
is that businesses which operate in geographically separate regions do not
compete in the same market because consumers would not travel great distances
297
to purchase certain goods or services. This may have been completely true in
the past, and it may still be true for certain types of goods and services today. Yet
one will have to acknowledge that since the territoriality doctrine was first
adopted by the Supreme Court in 1923,298 our society has become more mobile.
Courts and trademark scholars have acknowledged that for today's consumers,
geographical distances are less of an obstacle today than they were in the past.299
This is true not only because of the emergence of the Internet 3°° but also because
of the dramatic increase in foreign travel. In fact, the instant case itself disproves
the assumption that consumers do not travel great distances to purchase goods or
services."'
The Court of Appeals deserves some acclaim for its effort to adapt to these
developments. Granting Lanham Act protection to marks that are systematically
advertised in the United States and attach to services that are purchased by a
substantial number of American consumers abroad does not seem completely
unreasonable. In fact, there is nothing in the words of the language of the
Lanham Act or in its legislative history that suggests that both elements of the
"use in commerce" test have to be met on American soil. However, the court
introduces a new, broad interpretation of "use in commerce" that falls to provide
manageable criteria.
First, the court failed to state exactly what element of the "use in commerce" test
has to be met within the geographic borders of the United States. The court does not
only hold that a mark can be protected under United States trademark law when it is
advertised in the United States and attaches to services rendered abroad,30 2 it seems to
be willing to go even beyond that. According to the majority, a mark owner must
render services in foreign commerce and use or display the mark in the sale or
advertising of services to United States consumers 3 to be eligible for Lanham Act
protection. This implies that the "use or display of the mark" does not have to occur
within the geographic territory of the United States either, as long as the mark is
displayed to U.S. consumers anywhere in the world. Here the mark was displayed by
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SBM in the United States through the operation of its New York office and various
other promotional activities, and the services the mark was attached to were rendered
to U.S consumers abroad.
However, the International Bancorp court's rule also allows protection of a
mark in the reverse situation when services are rendered in the United States, but the
mark is used or displayed only abroad. Admittedly, such a factual situation is rather
unlikely. However, the court's rule implies even more than that. Because the court
grants Lanham Act protection where a mark is displayed in the United States and the
services to which it is attached are rendered to American consumers abroad (thereby
allowing the first element of the test to be met abroad) and further implicitly says that
protection can also be granted where services are rendered in the United States, but
the mark is displayed solely to American consumers abroad (thereby allowing the
second element to be met abroad) while saying nothing to suggest that at least one of
the two elements has to be met within the geographic borders of the United States,
the court appears to allow for protection to marks that are displayed solely to
American consumers abroad and attach to services rendered solely abroad.
Eventually, the court could allow all marks to be protected under the Lanham Act
provided that they are advertised to American consumers anywhere in the world and
the goods or services they are attached to are purchased by American consumers
anywhere in the world.3°4
Second, the court did not make any suggestion as to what extent a mark has to be
advertised to United States consumers. Here the display and advertisement of the
contested mark included the operation of a promotional office, distribution of the
mark owner's own magazine and extensive media coverage funded with $ 1,000,000
annually.3 °5 In short, the marketing activities were rather extensive. The court does
not say, however, how much promotional activity directed to American consumers
would suffice. Could a mark be granted when it is advertised solely via the Internet
on the mark owner's foreign-registered web site, as long as it is (or can be) visited by
American consumers, and the attached services are rendered to U.S. consumers
anywhere in the world?

304. To illustrate the consequences, consider the following example: Ramstein Airbase in Germany is
one of the largest American settlements outside the borders of the United States. American consumers constitute
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Finally, the court fails to set reasonable standards as to how extensive the
purchases of goods or services have to be in order to meet the "use in commerce"
requirement. Again, in the principal case, the purchases of casino services
conducted by U.S. citizens were rather extensive and accounted for twenty-two
percent of SBM's customers.3 6 But in its discussion of Person's, the court
3 7
suggests that even a single purchase could be enough. Generally, small sales of
38
goods can be sufficient to establish priority of a mark. Even a single use in
trade may sustain trademark rights if followed by continuous commercial
30
utilization.3 O Without challenging this doctrine categorically, it is fair to ask
whether a higher standard should be applied when the sales occur in a foreign
country. A reasonable limitation to the court's "use in commerce" rule could be
achieved by incorporating the "market penetration" test traditionally used to
determine the territorial scope of trademark rights by measuring the quantity of
sales. 1 In Lucent Information Management, Inc. v. Lucent Technologies Inc., the
Third Circuit raised the threshold of "use" required to establish priority when it
established a four-factor test looking at the volume of sales, growth trends,
3 2
number of purchasers, and the amount of advertising. " Without discussing the
merits of the Lucent test as applied to solely domestic use of a mark, there is a
strong argument to apply similar criteria where a mark is attached to services
rendered exclusively abroad. Specifically, one would have to look at the volume
of sales to American consumers, growth trends of sales to American consumers
abroad, growth trends into the domestic American market, and the amount of
advertising directed to American consumers. The court fails to provide any such
criteria.
Looking at these shortcomings, International Bancorp seems to be in line
with a number of other "anti-cyber-squatting" cases, in which courts applied
questionable legal reasoning to reach a result they desire for mere policy
reasons.31 1 One has to presume that one of the true reasons for the court's holding
is that it did not want to rule against the "rightful owner" of a mark, leaving it to
a conglomerate of undercapitalized companies, all owned by one individual,
which have substantially no officers, directors, or members, no employees, and
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no corporate records. 3 4 Understandable as this may be, the approach the Court of
Appeals has chosen is hardly beneficial to a reasonable and orderly development
of trademark law.
IV. CONCLUSION

The Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the "use in commerce" clause indicates
a major shift in the law of protection of foreign trademarks in the United States.
Turning away from the strict application of the territoriality doctrine underlying
previous decisions in this field, the International Bancorp decision allows
foreign trademarks to be protected under the Lanham Act even if they are used
solely abroad. The court deserves some praise for its attempt to adapt to
globalized markets and increased consumer mobility. However, the court goes
too far by introducing a seemingly boundless understanding of "use in
commerce," and by failing to provide manageable criteria to secure a substantial
connection of the foreign mark to the domestic market.
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